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INTELLIGENCE FOR SECURITY

by

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	Page
REORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	937
Hearings on Plan for Supervision of C.I.A.	937
New Look at C.I.A. After the Cuban Invasion	938
Proposals for Changes Under New Director	938
Broad Distribution of Intelligence Functions	939
Pressure for Closer Supervision of the C.I.A.	941
GROWTH OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY	943
Wartime Intelligence Needs and the O.S.S.	944
Postwar Creation and Functions of the C.I.A.	945
Nature of Intelligence Work in Satellite Era	947
MAJOR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES AT C.I.A.	948
Problem of Recruiting and Protecting Personnel	948
Blowup Over U-2 Spying After Numerous Flights	950
Record of the C.I.A. in Foreign Political Activity	951
C.I.A.'s Disputed Role in Abortive Invasion of Cuba	953

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INTELLIGENCE FOR SECURITY

A REVIEW in public of the functions and performance of the highly secret Central Intelligence Agency is likely to provoke intense controversy at the approaching session of Congress. Soon after Congress convenes, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to set a date for opening hearings on a joint resolution introduced by Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn.) last April 27, ten days after the abortive Cuban invasion.¹ The resolution provides for creation of a Joint Committee of the House and Senate on Foreign Intelligence and Information. The committee, in the words of McCarthy, would "establish some kind of continuing supervision over foreign policy activities and foreign intelligence and information programs by the U.S. government."

A similar proposal was given extended consideration by the Senate in 1956. Pressure for instituting a form of congressional supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency comparable to that exercised over the Atomic Energy Commission may be stronger today than it was six years ago. Failure of the anti-Castro Cuban invasion, which was carried out under the direction of C.I.A., called into question again the almost unlimited extent of that agency's powers and, in particular, its participation in foreign ventures that carry risk of seriously damaging the prestige and interests of the United States.

Sen. McCarthy said, when he introduced the pending joint resolution, that he considered it to be "a proper responsibility on the part of the members of the U.S. Congress to accept responsibility in this field, to be informed, and to be involved when major policy decisions are called for." He added: "Under the Constitution, Congress is called upon to participate in a declaration of war. In modern times, war is not declared. Congress, therefore, has a continuing and a very substantial responsibility for

¹ The resolution was co-sponsored by 21 other senators—18 Democrats and 3 Republicans.

policy decisions with regard to the cold war or conducting foreign policy by any other means."

Since the Cuban invasion, the Central Intelligence Agency has acquired a new director—former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John A. McCone—and its operations have been the subject of review by two presidential boards. Their findings and recommendations presumably will be available to the Foreign Relations Committee, though perhaps not to the public, when the McCarthy resolution is taken up for consideration.

NEW LOOK AT C.I.A. AFTER THE CUBAN INVASION

The size of the Central Intelligence Agency, its annual expenditures, its methods of gathering intelligence, and the scope of its undercover operations have all been treated as top secret information. Although C.I.A. was created to gather intelligence considered essential for national security, there never has been any accounting to the public of how satisfactorily it has performed that task. Nor has its involvement in various political operations in foreign countries ever been officially acknowledged.

Since the Cuban invasion came a cropper, President Kennedy has put some curbs on C.I.A.'s activities, and a reorganization of the agency is now proceeding under the leadership of its new chairman. C.I.A. is no longer as powerful as when Allen W. Dulles, its director from 1953 to the end of November 1961, said in a speech at the Yale Conference on Human Resources, Feb. 3, 1959:

There never has been a time in history . . . when intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its view over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947, creating a Central Intelligence Agency, has given intelligence a more influential position in our government than intelligence enjoys in any other in the world.

While C.I.A. has lost influence in the past eight months, its functions have not yet been clearly redefined.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES UNDER NEW DIRECTOR

President Kennedy announced McCone's appointment as C.I.A. director on Sept. 27, and McCone took over from Dulles on Nov. 29. Selection of McCone ended an extensive search for a man who would combine a variety of skills and at the same time enjoy the absolute confidence of both the President and the Congress. Harry H. Ran-

Intelligence for Security

som, in a study for the Harvard Defense Studies Program, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, wrote that the director of C.I.A. "must be a rare combination of administrative expert, imaginative scholar, courageous master spy, and a person of keen political sensitivity to the political ideals of the American republic, . . . a master judge and politician, but not a political partisan, and should be possessed of an inner integrity and common sense."²

McCone continues to have responsibility for covert operations abroad in the collection of information and for undercover operations unrelated to intelligence-gathering. But both the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a special board headed by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who was asked by the President after the Cuban invasion to inquire into the whole field of intelligence operations, reportedly agreed last July that the director's powers should be curtailed. It is understood that they recommended that the director's chief function should be to supervise the vast number of C.I.A. personnel engaged in gathering and analyzing information. Execution of so-called paramilitary operations, such as the Cuban invasion, would be turned over to the Department of Defense.

The new director's first task presumably is to prune the C.I.A. bureaucracy. The agency grew to two or three times the size of the State Department during Allen Dulles's tenure. Dulles was reputed to be a master spy, but he showed little concern over expansion of his agency. McCone, on the other hand, gained a reputation at the Atomic Energy Commission as a decisive and strong-willed administrator.

BROAD DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

Nearly a score of federal departments and agencies are engaged today in some form of intelligence work. The principal agencies collecting or analyzing foreign intelligence include the State Department, the Defense Department, separate Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units, the A.E.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and the National Security Council and its staff. The report of a Hoover Commission task force in 1955 asserted that the intelligence activities of some of these groups "approach or exceed the operations of the C.I.A. in functions and expenditures."

² Harry H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security* (1958), p. 92.

Except for the National Security Agency, which is an ultra-secret, code-making, code-breaking and communications security organization, most of these groups collect intelligence which they need for their own operations. However, because C.I.A. conducts particularly sensitive operations in foreign countries and is charged with overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence output of all government agencies, its director has greater authority than is enjoyed by any other government official concerned with intelligence matters.

At hearings in 1958 before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on Department of Defense appropriations, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Wienecke was asked whether the Army could not disband its \$125 million intelligence apparatus and rely for information entirely on C.I.A. He replied: "Their mission is a little different. . . . They get more into the field of political, economic, etcetera, whereas we try to deal mostly with military hardware." He added that Army intelligence worked "hand in glove" with C.I.A. and made major contributions to central intelligence.

The Air Force justified its need for a separate intelligence unit by insisting that particular knowledge of a potential enemy's air power and of prospective bombing targets was vital to American security. Under a reorganization plan in 1958, Air Force intelligence now has five major subdivisions: 1) a policy and management group; 2) an electronics intelligence coordinating group, which operates radar tracking stations around the globe; 3) a directorate of collection and dissemination, which supervises reconnaissance mapping; 4) a directorate of estimates, which maintains a world-wide surveillance system in the aviation field for evidence of possible hostile action or movements; and 5) a targets directorate, which compiles all target information and publishes the *Bombing Encyclopedia*.

Under a plan announced last Aug. 2 by Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric, a new unit, to be known as the Defense Intelligence Agency, was established under the direction of Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll. The new agency combines a number of intelligence functions formerly performed by the separate Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units but in no way supersedes them. The Defense Intelligence Agency will presumably prepare

Intelligence for Security

intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs of Staff free of the "parochialism" of the individual services.

Within the State Department about 400 persons are employed in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. While C.I.A. and the Department of State undoubtedly duplicate each other's work in some respects, the daily briefings of the Secretary of State and his principal deputies frequently emphasize other areas than those of immediate concern to C.I.A. Moreover, in the interests of American diplomacy, the State Department has to be kept free of any connection with C.I.A.'s undercover operations.

The role of the F.B.I. is limited to counter-intelligence and is rarely concerned with foreign intelligence. The F.B.I. has jurisdiction over domestic investigations of espionage, sabotage and other matters relating to internal security. A.E.C., primarily interested in data on foreign atomic energy or nuclear weapons development, provides technical guidance to C.I.A. in the collection of information. It is the function of C.I.A., drawing on information gathered by its own agents and by other members of the intelligence community, to develop over-all intelligence estimates for the various groups.

PRESSURE FOR CLOSER SUPERVISION OF THE C.I.A.

The existence of a huge intelligence operation, reportedly expending around \$1 billion a year and subject to only minimal legislative supervision, has been a thorn in the side of Congress. Rep. Emilio Q. Daddario (D Conn.), speaking on the House floor last Sept. 26, said that "The time has come to analyze the functions which are coming under one roof in the new C.I.A. headquarters . . . and to examine them carefully and make them responsible to democratic government."³

The success of congressional surveillance in the atomic energy field, an area as sensitive as foreign intelligence, has led many members of House and Senate to conclude that equal secrecy could be maintained by a joint committee on the C.I.A. Sen. Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) told the Senate, June 23, 1960, that "A special joint committee of Congress on the C.I.A. should be established on the pattern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and should be

³ The C.I.A. recently moved into a new \$50 million building at Langley, Va., on the outskirts of Washington. It will serve as an operations center for more than 12,000 employees previously scattered in 35 buildings.

kept as fully apprised as possible, in relation to the national interest, of any of the remaining functions of the C.I.A."⁴ This proposal, made repeatedly in both houses since 1956, closely follows a recommendation of the Hoover Commission, June 28, 1955, that Congress create a watchdog committee to collaborate with the Executive on matters of special importance to the national security.

The Hoover Commission emphasized that while the C.I.A. operation was sound in principle, improvement was needed in coordinating evaluations of the various intelligence groups. Members of the commission were "deeply concerned over the lack of adequate intelligence behind the Iron Curtain." A task force under the chairmanship of Gen. Mark W. Clark, making the actual investigation of government intelligence activities for the Hoover Commission, had recommended, and the full commission endorsed, establishment of a small permanent commission responsible to the President which would: "1) conduct comprehensive studies of foreign intelligence activities of the United States, 2) look for overlapping and duplication, 3) determine whether expenditures are within budget authorizations and in keeping with the expressed intent of Congress, and 4) consider whether any of the activities are in conflict with the foreign policy aims and program of the United States."

Such a commission, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, was created by executive order of President Eisenhower on Feb. 6, 1956, to conduct a continuing review of foreign intelligence activities along the lines stated above and report its findings to the President every six months. This board was superseded on May 4, 1961, by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.⁵

Objections in Congress to C.I.A. secrecy were not met by establishment of the presidential board because members felt it only strengthened the already tight control of the Executive over C.I.A. Furthermore, it made no provision for maintenance of congressional liaison. Sen.

⁴ Mansfield said also that "The functions of the C.I.A. in the gathering of non-clandestine intelligence information should be integrated into already existing intelligence branches of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in order to limit what, at present, appears to be a greater duplication of effort."

⁵ Members of the new board are: James A. Killian, Jr., chairman, William O. Baker, Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Frank Pace, Gordon Gray, William L. Langer, Clark Clifford, Robert D. Murphy, and Edwin H. Land.

Theodore F. Green (D R.I.) introduced a resolution on Feb. 22, 1956, to create a joint committee to provide legislative oversight of C.I.A. The committee was to be composed of six members of the Senate and six members of the House drawn from subcommittees on the C.I.A. of the respective Committees on Appropriations and the Armed Services.

The Senate rejected the resolution, April 11, 1956, by a roll call vote of 59 to 27. Sen. Richard B. Russell (D Ga.) said in the debate preceding the vote that "It would be more desirable to abolish the C.I.A. and close it up, lock, stock and barrel, than to adopt any such theory as that all the members of Congress . . . are entitled to know the details of all the activities of this far-flung organization." Sen. Carl Hayden (D Ariz.) voiced agreement with Russell and added that "Congress has no right . . . to regulate an agency . . . designed solely to provide the President . . . with information to enable him to make decisions."

It has been asserted that the surveillance already exercised by senior members of the Appropriations and Armed Services committees handling C.I.A. affairs is sufficient. Consequently all proposals to establish a special joint C.I.A. committee have been pigeonholed and the C.I.A. remains the only major federal agency largely free of congressional scrutiny.

Growth of Central Intelligence Activity

THIS COUNTRY has carried on intelligence activities since the days of George Washington. It was not until World War II, however, that such operations were systematized on a government-wide basis and insulated from normal checks and balances. Historically, the United States relied on its diplomatic and military services to provide the foreign intelligence deemed necessary for national security. There was only a limited intelligence service during World War I. After the armistice, appropriations for military intelligence usually ran to less than \$200,000 a year.

Many Americans took pride in the fact that their government did not engage in spying in time of peace and

that it did not try to compete with foreign nations in developing and maintaining world-wide espionage and counter-intelligence systems.⁶ But the War Department's lack of adequate intelligence on the eve of Pearl Harbor represented, in the words of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning."⁷ The Hoover Commission reported in 1955 that "The C.I.A. may well attribute its existence to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor." What happened on Dec. 7, 1941, demonstrated the woeful inadequacy of the intelligence-gathering system as then constituted.

WARTIME INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND THE O.S.S.

Today's coordinated intelligence operations had their origin in the emergency plans drawn up during the second World War. Five months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had appointed Col. W. J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan as Coordinator of Information with instructions to "collect and analyze all information and data bearing upon national security." Roosevelt told Donovan to draft a plan for a new intelligence service to meet the requirements of global war. He would "have to begin with nothing" because "we have no intelligence service."⁸

Formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1942 made coordination of intelligence operations a prime necessity. The Office of the Coordinator of Information was abolished in June 1942, and its intelligence functions were transferred to an Office of Strategic Services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁹ In addition to normal intelligence analysis, the O.S.S., still headed by Donovan, participated in "cloak and dagger operations," infiltration of enemy territory, sabotage, and support of resistance movements in enemy-occupied lands. Its main function, however, was the gathering and evaluation of information about the capabilities of the Axis powers. By war's end, some 12,000 O.S.S. operatives were engaged in every kind of intelligence work and the annual cost of the operation had risen to well over \$50 million a year.

Unofficial opinions of the effectiveness of the "cloak and

⁶ See "Foreign Intelligence," *E.R.R.*, 1949 Vol. I, pp. 351-364.

⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (1948), p. 32.

⁸ William J. Donovan, "Intelligence: Key to Defense," *Life*, Sept. 30, 1946, p. 108.

⁹ Foreign information activities of the Coordinator were transferred to the newly created Office of War Information, which consolidated in one agency both foreign and domestic war information activities of the government.

Intelligence for Security

dagger" activities have varied widely. O.S.S. agents appeared to operate effectively in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, where they generally enjoyed the confidence of theater commanders, to whom they were responsible, and where they worked closely with underground resistance movements. In the Far East, the agency's operations were apparently less successful. Gen. MacArthur consistently refused to allow O.S.S. agents to work in his theater.¹⁰

Confusion in the area of foreign intelligence continued in Washington throughout the war because neither the Joint Intelligence Committee, on which O.S.S. was represented, nor the O.S.S. itself was able to provide the badly needed central clearing house. Both Congress and the Executive Branch therefore felt it unwise to keep O.S.S. in existence after the war. Truman ordered the agency disbanded on Oct. 1, 1945; its functions and some of its personnel were transferred to the State Department and the military intelligence services. However, Truman recognized the need for coordinated intelligence services and wrote later that "The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form."¹¹

The nucleus of a postwar agency to coordinate foreign intelligence was assured when Truman created a National Intelligence Authority, Jan. 22, 1946, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and a personal representative of the President. The Authority was instructed to plan, develop, and coordinate "all federal foreign intelligence activities" in order to accomplish "the intelligence mission related to the national security." Fears persisted, however, that a single, centralized intelligence agency, though seemingly logical, might acquire power beyond anything intended and endanger the American form of government.

POSTWAR CREATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE C.I.A.

Development of the cold war made it necessary to consider re-creation of an intelligence organization like that

¹⁰ See "Surveillance of Spying," *E.R.R.*, 1956 Vol. I, pp. 146-147.

¹¹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Vol. II, 1956), p. 56.

built up during the period of hostilities. Threats of Soviet aggression and disclosure of extensive Communist spy rings in the United States and Canada gave impetus to demands for strong centralized intelligence machinery tied in with a reorganized defense establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 sought to meet this need. Under the act the National Intelligence Authority was superseded by the Central Intelligence Agency. The director of C.I.A. was made directly responsible to the National Security Council, also created by the act,¹² and given responsibility for advising the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security."

The National Security Act made it the duty of the C.I.A. to "advise the National Security Council with respect to governmental intelligence activities related to national security," to perform "services of common concern" for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, and to perform "such other functions and duties . . . as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The latter functions were generally understood to include undercover activities similar to those carried on by O.S.S. in wartime. The act further said that the agency "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions," and that the "Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 strengthened administration of intelligence operations with regard to such matters as procurement, instruction of personnel, and travel allowances.¹³ The law made special provision for transfers of funds between C.I.A. and other agencies, and it gave the director authority to expend funds, "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds," on vouchers certified by him alone. Funds for C.I.A. are believed to be contained in appropriations for the armed services and the Atomic Energy Commission, but the actual amounts remain a tightly guarded secret. Allen Dulles frequently said that the figures quoted in the press, which

¹² The N.S.C. is now composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

¹³ Special alien admission clauses to aid the nation's intelligence mission were also included.

Intelligence for Security

often have exceeded \$1 billion, "were several times exaggerated."

NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE WORK IN SATELLITE ERA

The typical intelligence agent today is more apt to work with a slide rule or a camera than with firearms. He knows more about electronics and computers than about invisible ink. Experts in the field estimate¹⁴ that U.S. intelligence is derived from the following sources in roughly the proportions indicated below:

Clandestine operations, secret sources, secret agents	20 per cent
Press, radio, tourists, published documents and other standard sources	25 per cent
Routine reports, State Department and other government officials abroad	25 per cent
Military attachés in U.S. embassies and routine military operations	30 per cent

More than 200,000 Communist newspapers, technical magazines, pamphlets, etc., are screened by the C.I.A. each month. Processed by a variety of experts, these open sources of information are invaluable in maintaining a continuing flow of information on the Communist states. All such material is coded and stored under a central filing system where it is readily available.

Perfection of machines which will translate Russian into English electronically at 90 times the speed of the average human translator will enable C.I.A. to double or triple the number of documents previously translated. The agency's facilities and techniques for abstracting, translating, storing, and indexing information have been praised as the "most comprehensive information system now in operation."¹⁵

Samos, the spy satellite, which is expected to be fully operational early in 1962, carries cameras capable of identifying an intercontinental missile from a height of 300 miles. Such a satellite will be able to spot missile bases, radar installations, troop and weapon concentrations, new military highways, airfields, and munition factories.¹⁶

Midas, a 3,500-pound satellite containing infra-red and

¹⁴ Ransom, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁵ Senate Committee on Government Operations, *Documentating, Indexing, and Retrieval of Scientific Information*, May 24, 1960, p. 16.

¹⁶ Tiros I, a weather reconnaissance satellite, has been taking photographs of weather build-ups over the Soviet Union systematically since April 1, 1960, and the Russians have not objected.

electronic devices, will soon enable the United States to "see" missiles as they are launched by the Soviet Union by picking up the heat or ionization produced by the blast-off. Once Samos has located intercontinental ballistic missile sites, a system of Midas satellites will keep watch of the sites for first signs of a missile firing.

Although both Midas and Samos failed to go into orbit when first launched in 1960, Midas II, Samos II, Midas III and Midas IV were all successfully orbited—the last-named on Oct. 21—and are still circling the earth. Both types of satellites are equipped with electronic systems for transmitting images to earth instantaneously.¹⁷ When several Samos and Midas satellites crisscross the Soviet Union hourly, as they are expected to do sometime in 1962, the United States can maintain continuous surveillance over Russian military movements and missile launchings, thus reducing chances of a surprise attack.

Major Successes and Failures at C.I.A.

FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES have stood in the way of gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union ever since the need for such information was recognized. Lack of qualified language and area specialists and the Kremlin's habits of extreme secrecy have blocked adequate evaluation of both specific operations and long-range programs. Addressing the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences on Jan. 26, 1960, C.I.A. Director Dulles said that the postwar years "have hardly been sufficient to put everything in order." Emphasizing that there were always intangibles, unpredictable, and unknowables in the gathering of data on the Soviet Union, Dulles said that "The best one can do is to see that one's batting average is relatively high."

PROBLEM OF RECRUITING AND PROTECTING PERSONNEL

Around 80 per cent of every thousand applicants for C.I.A. employment are screened out by personnel officials in preliminary surveys. The 20 per cent initially approved are given a full security investigation, which includes lie detector tests and psychiatric examinations. About 11

¹⁷ Louis Klaar, "TV Space Spy," *Wall Street Journal*, May 10, 1960, p. 1.

Intelligence for Security

per cent of the applicants who undergo security investigations are rejected because it is indicated that they are prone to talk or drink too much, or because they have relatives behind the Iron Curtain and consequently might be open to foreign pressure. Further screening removes individuals whose contacts may render them undesirable for service in the agency. Thus it is a continuing problem for C.I.A. to recruit and maintain the force of highly qualified personnel needed to carry on its secret operations.

Defection to Russia in September 1960 of two Washington employees of the National Security Agency demonstrated that government security precautions are not infallible. It turned out that one of the defectors had been a homosexual and that the other had undergone extensive psychiatric treatment. President Eisenhower called the pair "traitorous," and the Defense Department said that both men—Vernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin—were "obviously confused." In a statement to the press, issued in Moscow Sept. 6, 1960, Martin and Mitchell said they were "disenchanted by the U.S. government's practice of intercepting and deciphering the secret communications of its own allies."

Intelligence agents run obvious risks. In the latest of a string of incidents involving American and foreign tourists in the Soviet Union, two young Germans, Walter Naumann and Peter Sonntag, pleaded guilty, Nov. 22, to charges of spying for the United States. The Soviet indictment accused them of trying to leave the country with 15 rolls of film that showed radar and power stations. The indictment charged that the two Germans had been recruited by American agents and had spent two months studying espionage methods before leaving on Aug. 28 for an automobile tour of Russia; they were supposed to seek out Soviet rocket bases, record troop movements, and report on whatever else they found of military interest.

To protect its agents, the C.I.A. must remain anonymous to the greatest possible extent. In a report on Feb. 23, 1956, the Senate Rules Committee said:

An intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it.

Because of this need for secrecy, the C.I.A. does not identify its personnel except for a few officials in the top echelon, does not confirm or deny published reports, whether good or bad, and virtually never makes alibis.¹⁸

BLOWUP OVER U-2 SPYING AFTER NUMEROUS FLIGHTS

High altitude U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union came forcefully to public attention on May 5, 1960, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev angrily disclosed that an American plane on a mission of "aggressive provocation" had been shot down four days earlier near Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains. A spokesman for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration maintained that the plane had been studying "gust meteorological conditions" and was missing on a flight over Lake Van near the Turkish-Soviet border.¹⁹

The NASA cover story was demolished when Khrushchev announced on May 7 that the U-2 plane had been brought down by Soviet rockets, that substantial parts of the plane had been recovered, and that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was alive and in Russian hands. Khrushchev detailed the reconnaissance apparatus carried by the plane and said that Powers had been ordered to commit suicide in order "not to fall alive into the hands of the Soviet authorities." The pilot, however, had parachuted from the crippled plane in such a way as not to activate a self-destructive charge and had neglected to use a poisoned needle with which he had been provided.²⁰

The State Department thereupon admitted that the U-2 plane had been on a reconnaissance mission that was to take it from Pakistan to Norway at an altitude of 68,000 feet. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter said, May 9, that "extensive aerial surveillance [of the Soviet Union] by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration," had been carried out. He added that the specific missions of these aircraft,

¹⁸ Sen. Russell (D Ga.) told the Senate on April 11, 1956, that it "almost chills the marrow of a man to hear about" the clandestine activities of C.I.A. agents.

¹⁹ The Soviet Union had formally complained to the U.S. embassy in Moscow on Sept. 2, 1958, that balloons had been sent over the U.S.S.R. on spying missions. The United States maintained that the balloons only carried cameras for photographing cloud formations and were part of a high altitude meteorological project.

²⁰ Powers pleaded guilty on Aug. 17 before a high military tribunal in Moscow to charges of having flown an intelligence mission over the Soviet Union in accordance with a contract he had signed with C.I.A. He was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor.

Intelligence for Security

more than 150 of which had reportedly been flown over the Soviet Union between 1956 and 1960, "had not been subject to presidential authorization" but that the program had been initiated by direction of the President.

President Eisenhower said at a news conference, May 11, 1960, that the intelligence-gathering activities of the U-2 were necessary because "We must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack."

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. . . . [Spying] is a distasteful but vital necessity. We prefer and work for a different kind of world—and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

The President's decision to assume responsibility for the flights was unprecedented in intelligence operations. It was the first time that the United States, or any other major world power, had officially admitted involvement in an espionage operation. Eisenhower said in Paris on May 16, after Khrushchev had made use of the affair to break up the scheduled East-West summit conference, that "These flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed." Although actual scheduling of U-2 flights was in the hands of C.I.A., Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, May 31, 1960, that he was satisfied that the agency had not assumed any policymaking function in the affair.

Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr., told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 2, 1960, that halting of the U-2 flights after almost four years "removed an important source of intelligence." Gates disclosed that the flights brought "information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production, and aircraft deployments." He said this information enabled the Pentagon accurately to evaluate Russia's military posture.

RECORD OF THE C.I.A. IN FOREIGN POLITICAL ACTIVITY

President Kennedy, speaking on Nov. 28 at a ceremony in honor of Allen W. Dulles, told the retiring director of

C.I.A. that "Your successes are unheralded, your failures trumpeted." The President added that "the long sweep of history" would judge the significance of C.I.A.'s efforts. While little is publicly known about the agency's recent experience in gathering intelligence, its past record is spotty.

The United States received no clear warning of the Communist attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950. Crossing of the Yalu River by Chinese Communist troops that autumn also took American forces by surprise. Although Chinese units actually had crossed the Yalu in force on Oct. 16, Gen. MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Nov. 4 that it was "impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of the Chinese Communist invasion in North Korea."²¹

C.I.A.'s accomplishments in working for the downfall of distrusted political regimes are likewise uneven. The agency reportedly played a leading role in sparking a coup that ousted Mohammed Mossadegh as Premier of Iran in August 1953. Mossadegh, in collusion with the Communist Tudeh Party, had tried to exile the Shah. Fear of a Communist takeover prompted the C.I.A. to step in. C.I.A. had some part also in ridding Guatemala of the Red-dominated regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954. The agency got wind of a shipment of 1,900 tons of Czechoslovak arms from Poland to supply and reinforce the Guatemalan Communists. When Secretary of State Dulles made the information public on May 25, 1954, anti-Communist Guatemalan forces, headed by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, moved into the country from neighboring Honduras. John Peurifoy, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, is believed to have masterminded the coup.

Results of supposed C.I.A. activities in Laos in the autumn of 1960 were less happy. An attempt to replace a doubtful neutralist, Prince Souvanna Phouma, with Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, principally because he was the most anti-Communist of Laotian leaders, dealt Western interests a severe setback. The fact that Nosavan was politically unpopular, and the additional fact that his army was ineffectual, had not been taken fully into account. In trying to create a Western-type army among people who were incapable of being forced into a foreign military mold, the

²¹ Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (1956), p. 372.

Intelligence for Security

C.I.A.'s associates in the Department of Defense made another mistake. When attacked by Communist-trained guerrillas, Nosavan's forces were ultimately compelled to retreat.

C.I.A.'S DISPUTED ROLE IN ABORTIVE INVASION OF CUBA

Immediate and complete disaster overtook the C.I.A.-directed invasion of Cuba last spring. Within 72 hours after the anti-Castro forces had landed, April 17, approximately 1,500 men had been killed or captured by the vastly superior defending forces. C.I.A. was immediately accused of faulty intelligence work.

Although the agency insisted that its intelligence estimates had not been at fault, Castro's Soviet tanks and Communist-trained militia obviously were far stronger than the invasion planners thought they would be. Moreover, expectations of a popular uprising in Cuba, once a force of considerable size had landed, turned out to have been based on wishful thinking. C.I.A. had not only failed to notify the Cuban underground of the coming landings but had also held leaders of the U.S.-based Revolutionary Council virtual prisoners while the invasion was being launched. Yet the success of the invasion seemed clearly to depend on rousing the Cuban people through the underground and through participation of members of the Revolutionary Council in some way in the actual operation.

President Kennedy said on April 20 that "There are from this sobering episode useful lessons for all to learn." The President made it clear the following day that primary responsibility for the Cuban affair was his. He had allowed the invasion to take place and had permitted the invasion force to be armed and trained by the C.I.A. Two days later he appointed Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to head an inquiry into C.I.A.'s role in the invasion and in American guerrilla warfare training.

Post-mortems of the Cuban disaster turned up a significant number of tactical and strategic errors allegedly committed by C.I.A. It was asserted that the agency's past successes in foreign political undertakings gave it an air of "omniscience and omnipotence" and persuaded officials in Washington to entrust it with the training of Cuban refugees for an invasion.²² C.I.A. operatives who planned

²² Fred J. Cook, "The C.I.A., *The Nation*, June 24, 1961, p. 563.

the invasion were said to have kept their superiors in the dark about many aspects of the plan. They ignored an order by President Kennedy to exclude followers of the former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista from the venture. The C.I.A. agents were reported to have been reluctant to part with well-trained rightist leaders.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., a deputy of Allen Dulles, and Frank Bender, C.I.A. area chief in Guatemala, placed a young Cuban named Manuel Artime, who had had little military experience, in command of the special training camps established in Guatemala, where the refugee recruits were shaped into a commando force. Initially, the plan worked out by the C.I.A. and Artime called for creation of 30 guerrilla and sabotage groups inside Cuba under orders to go into action at the moment sea and air landings were made. These units were to throw Cuba into intense turmoil and exploit popular resentment against the Castro regime. However, the People's Revolutionary Movement, an underground organization directed by Manuel Ray, a one-time Minister of Public Works, reportedly received no support and almost no equipment. The alleged reason for C.I.A.'s reluctance to aid the only effective resistance movement in Cuba until almost the very end was that Ray and his associates were considered too radical and politically undesirable.

Apparently few officials in Washington had any idea of the training techniques of the C.I.A. or the support given by the agency to right-wing groups. Rep. Paul G. Rogers (D Fla.) said in the House of Representatives on May 1 that "If it is true that the agency mapped the invasion plan, herded the Cuban resistance leaders around like redheaded step-children and conducted military operations in their stead, then we have trusted a government agency to make all but war without the consent of Congress." Rep. William Fitts Ryan (D N.Y.) said in the House, May 9, that "Apparently the C.I.A. was operating a private foreign policy of its own."



